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An Overview
With the fall of China to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the Kuomintang
Party (KMT) fled to Taiwan while some of its troops from the Eight Army, comprising
the 26th Division and the 93rd Division, under the command of General Li Mi,
entered the Shan State in Burma. 1) These KMT troops were active in Kengtung and
Tachilek. But on July 21, 1950, the Kengtung-Tachilek road occupied by the KMT
troops was cleared and occupied by the Burmese Government. 2)
The original purpose of the KMT troops, sometimes known as the Yunnan Anti-
Communist National Salvation Army, was to use the Shan States as the springboard for the
recapture of Yunnan.  To do that it was important for the KMT to join with the Karen
National Defense Organisation (KNDO).  In January 1952, the KMT troops infiltrated
into the Mawchi area.  By October 1952, a detachment of 700 KMT from Muang Hsat
joined the insurgent KNDO and entered Mawchi, Papun, Hlaingbwe, Karoppi and
Panga.  Another group of 300 KMT crossed the Salween River and marched into Pong
Pang State.  The KMT troops were employed for defense of KNDO strongholds such
as Mawchi, Papun, and other places. 3)
By the second half of 1950s the KMT troops no longer confined themselves to the
areas in which they previously were concentrated.  They changed their policy and line
of action to occupy and dominate the whole of Shan and Kachin states to find an outlet
to the sea, a permanent unobstructed line of communication from the south to the
north, a permanent base on the northern frontier, and, above all, to create hostile
activities with attempts to overthrow the Union of Burma in collaboration with
insurgents taking up arms against the Union of Burma. 
Realizing that in order to launch a successful operation against the People’s Republic
of China [the PRC] in Yunnan, the Shan States and frontier areas of Burma had to be
turned into a secure military base.  The KMT in Burma issued a directive to its forces
to incite the citizens of Burma to rise up against the Government of Burma.  In 1952,
the Sawbwas, the heads of the autonomous states, in accordance with the desire of the
masses of the Shan States, voluntarily surrendered their offices and powers to the
Government of Burma.  The Government of Burma retaliated by declaring a major
portion of the Southern Shan States to be under military administration with a view to
effectively suppress the insurgents in those areas. 4) Exploiting this political issue, the
KMT issued a statement that they were out to help the people oppressed by the
Government of Burma and restore the autonomous chiefs, the Sawbwas, to their
former position of authority and power.  A propaganda campaign in the Shan and
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Burmese languages was launched inciting the people to open revolt. 
In the course of the evacuation of the KMT troops from Northern Burma, part of the
troops fled to Laos via Ban Houi Sai in the north.  There, they played an undercover
role in the fight against the Chinese Communists.  By 1960, the KMT had set up a new
headquarters in Ban Houi Sai bordering Burma.  While some of the KMT troops fled
to Laos in the course of evacuation, others fled to Thailand.  It was through Thailand
that the remaining KMT in Burma were able to get military supplies and continue its
opium trade.  Another evacuation of the KMT was launched in March 1961 under
United States pressure.  Since 1961, most of the KMT numbering 5,500 to 6,000 have
resided in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces of Thailand. 5)
The KMT troops were able to survive and continue their operations in Southeast
Asia, mainly in Burma, Laos and Thailand because of the Cold War.  The Cold War
was an intense economic, political, military and ideological rivalry between nations just
prior to military conflict, with the application of intense pressure on all levels by hostile
nations without becoming engaged in a shooting war.  In the Cold War, the KMT in
Southeast Asia actively participated in the ideological warfare between the free world
and the Communist would.
The collapse of the Nationalist Chinese Government or the KMT party in 1949 had
the effect of sharpening United States policy in the Far East, and hastening American
measures to counter the Chinese Communists.  The American Policy in Europe was
applied to the problem of the Far East: the Truman Doctrine was in effect extended
into the region.  The basis of the Truman Doctrine was that the US would provide
military assistance to support any nation which was resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressure.  The Mutual Defense Assistance Program was
passed by Congress on October 6, 1949.  It stipulated that United States arms, military
equipment and training assistance be provided worldwide for collective defense.  The
United States began to be more deeply concerned about Communist expansion in
Asia, and suspicion of nationalist movements also increased.  The political situation in
China in 1948-1949 brought the United States to a new perception of politics in Asia.
In 1949 the staff of the National Security Council, at the request of the Secretary of
Defense, reexamined American policy toward Asia.  The Secretary of Defense noted
that (1971: 39-40): 
...increasingly concerned at the advance of Communism in large areas of the
world and particularly the successes of Communism in China ..A major objective
of the United States policy, as I understand it is to contain Communism in order to
reduce its threat to our security.  Our actions in Asia should be part of a carefully
considered and comprehensive plan to further that objective. 6) However, on
December 30, 1949, NSC submitted another study to President Truman, and
approved the following conclusions: (1) US should make known its sympathy with
the efforts of Asian leaders to form regional associations of Non-Communists
States of Asia; (2) should develop and strengthen the security of the area from
Communist external aggression or internal subversion. (3) US should encourage
the creation of an atmosphere favourable to economic recovery and development
in non-Communist Asia; (4) US should exploit every opportunity to increase the
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present Western Orientation of the area. 7)
Regarding the possible greater use of Nationalist Chinese forces, a major programme
was already being carried on with American help using Nationalist Chinese forces to
keep the Communist Chinese on the mainland. 8) The first country to display concern
about its frontiers with the Republic of China was Burma which recognized the
Communist regime in Peking (December 1949).  After the Chinese Communist
government had replaced the Kuomintang, a Burmese approach was made to Peking,
suggesting a joint effort to settle and secure the frontier.  To this request however, there
was no clear or helpful response.  All that Mao Tse-Tung’s government had to offer
was an undertaking that the forces of the People’s Republic of China would not violate
Burma’s borders unless they found themselves under attack from the Nationalist
Chinese remnants based in Burmese territory.  The American Embassy in Rangoon
noted that (1950): 
...Chinese Communist troop intends to enter Kengtung for attacking the KMT.
Government of Burma immediately took matter up with Peking who instructed its
forces respect Burma territory but requests Government of Burma speed up its
operation. 9)
For these reasons the Government of Burma felt that essential steps needed to be
taken for the withdrawal of the KMT troops.  But the undefined China-Burma border,
the nomadic habits of the inhabitants of border areas, the lack of national controls and
organization in those areas, and the obvious inability of the Burmese government to
organize adequate defenses were all factors which invited Chinese Communist
attention if and whenever the latter chose to extend their activities into Southeast Asia.
The KMT Troops and Thailand
By 1948, Thailand was able to resume her role in Asian affairs and was awaking to
the implications of the civil war in China.  The Thai government knew thousands of
active Chinese Communists were already at work in the kingdom.  It appeared that the
Communist Chinese in Thailand had concentrated their efforts on gaining control of
the few thousand labourers in the rice and saw mills and among the stevedores and had
also initiated efforts to convert students in the Chinese schools. 10) However, this
enhanced Thailand’s international position of playing the role of go-between.  Prime
Minister Phibun had seen the situation and said, “Thailand is not susceptible to
Communism but the Government is tightening frontier controls against the
Communists.  Urgent building of the military highway between Chiang Rai and Fang is
being mounted by the Border Patrol Police.” 11) And Phibun also expressed distaste for
Communism in his reply.  He said, “By preparing to stem the spread of Communism
in this country...the Government would not be too strongly anti-Communist in order
avoid open conflict.” 12)
The role of the Thai government and some of its officials in the supply of arms and
materials to the KMT troops in Burma was a highly controversial issue in Thailand's
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diplomatic history.  When the Communists came to power in China in October 1949,
they did not immediately establish effective control over much of Yunnan, particularly
in the border area with Burma which was poorly defined and remote.  The remnants of
the defeated Nationalist armies in Yunnan: the 8th Army, 26th Army and 93rd
Division, became known as the Yunnan Anti-Communist Salvation Army, and began
crossing into Burma’s Kengtung State in late 1949.  In June 1950, they began to occupy
Monghsat, where they reorganized under General Li Mi, the Commander of the 8th
Army. 13) The Chinese Embassy in Bangkok sent its officials from the Office of the
Military Attache to Mae Sai to assist the KMT soldiers, in spite of the Thai Foreign
Ministry’s objection.  Thus the Thai Government officially closed the border on July
30. 14 ) There was some evidence which suggested that, by 1951, Phibun began to
consider giving support to the KMT troops if the Western powers did so.  He may have
done so for reasons of national security, namely that the KMT troops were useful as a
buffer force.  Also, in so doing, he would prove to the United States Thailand’s
commitment to fight Communism.  In October 1951, a telegram from the British
Ambassador, Bangkok to the Foreign Office, stated (1951): 
...Phibun’s straight admission of cooperation with an American clandestine
organization...He has admitted that he now thinks war almost inevitable and the
tenor of his words today exposed wishful thinking about automatic involvement of
United Nations forces in encountering any moves by Mao from South China... 15)
Evidently, Phibun had been approached by a representative of the Central
Intelligence Agency and asked to provide certain facilities to support General Li Mi.
The British Ambassador’s thinking on the issue of alliances was deeply influenced by
self interest, which he emphatically stated (1951): 
...Phibun’s “benevolent attitude” is, we suspect, also coloured by self interest.
There must presumably be some pay off for Siamese complicity in supply service
and there is plenty of evidence that Phao (Police General) is running the racket.
Whether Phibun gets his rake off or not, ... but point is that Phao knows he has
been handling American materials and Phibun knows it too. 16)
It appears that the supplies which the KMT troops obtained through Thailand,
including weapons, ammunition, medicines, and petroleum products, were paid for
with opium.  The shipment of these supplies from Thailand appears to have been
handled by Phao and his police units, as distinguished from the local police, and with
the help of the Chinese Military Attache’s office. 17)
It is clear that the Thai government had some misgivings all along regarding the
KMT troops, and it came under strong Burmese diplomatic pressure to terminate all
support given to the KMT troops.  Phibun realised that it was no longer to Thailand’s
advantage to permit clandestine arms supply through Thailand.  But the person with
real responsibility and power to enforce any policy decision on this matter was Phao, in
his capacity as Police Director-General and Deputy Minister of Interior.  Given Phao’s
position in the ruling clique and his police backing, he was powerful enough to act
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independently of such a government decision in favour of his own personal benefit and
in regard to CIA supplied arms. 18)
The KMT in Burma
The original purpose of the KMT troops was to use Burma as a refuge to
reorganisation and equip themselves with the intention of launching an offensive
against the PRC.  However, after three successive failures in May and July 1951 and
August 1952, despite their successful attempts to penetrate more than sixty miles into
China, they appear to have abandoned their original plan and turned their attention to
monopolising and expanding the opium trade in the Shan States.  The Burmese army
in February, March, November, and December 1951, and again in late 1952,
attempted to oust these KMT troops from Monghsat but was unsuccessful. 19)
The Burmese government viewed that the KMT offensive actions into Yunnan as an
attempt not to destroy Communist China but rather to destroy Burmese-Chinese
relations.  Burma feared that the presence of the KMT troops in Burma would
antagonize the PRC and provide it with an excuse to invade Burma.  The PRC was
also concerned about the situation in Burma.  The PRC, which was fighting the United
Nations forces in Korea, was afraid that a second front might be opened in the south by
the United States using Burma as a base of operations.  The KMT located there were
considered by the PRC to represent a nucleus for an invasion army. 20)
Thus immediate and effective action by the Burmese government became
imperative. 
In 1950 the Nationalist Chinese were estimated to comprise 1,200 men with 800
family members from the 93rd Division and the 8th and 26th armies who had drifted
into Kengtung near the Thai and Indochinese borders.  They were avoiding encounters
with the Burmese army and some were believed to be moving across Thai and
Indochina borders in the Mekong River and Lake Naung Lam areas.  The Chinese in
Burma were of four types. 
1. Chinese who had lived for a long time in the Sino-Burma border region but
who were forced by the Burmese authorities to leave that area in view of the
hostilities. 
2. Chinese soldiers who, seeking refuge in Burma, had permitted themselves to be
disarmed and interned. 
3. Citizens who had fled from Yunnan into Burma to escape the Communist
Chinese. 
4. Chinese government officials from southwest China who had escaped.  On the
side of the Burmese government, the activities of the KMT troops in Burma
were directed and supported by the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan.
The statement by the Honourable Justice U Myint Thein, Chairman of the
Delegation of Burma, at the seventh session of the General Assembly, United
Nations, on April 17, 1953 quoted in a United Press report with a Taipei
dateline, February 3, 1952 was as follows (1953: 38): 
...General Li Mi, Commander of the Nationalist Forces in Yunnan, is on this way
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back to rejoin his forces after more than a month in Formosa conferring with
authorities here.  It is no secret that General Li Mi conferred with the highest
military and political authorities here, and made field inspections of training
programmes being carried out by Nationalist armed forces. 21)
Thus, the Burmese government believed that General Li Mi had been back and
forth between Taiwan and Monghsat since then.  Additional and substantial evidence
of Taiwan’s complicity was provided by the phenomenal improvement in the
armaments at that time carried by the KMT forces in Burma.  The troops which first
entered Burma in 1950 were armed mainly with weapons of Chinese, Italian and
Czechoslovakian origin.  They had a sprinkling of American manufactured weapons
such as carbines and light machine guns and mortars. 22) In 1950 the KMT troops had
approximately 1,500 soldiers, and their activities were restricted to only a part of the
Kengtung State.  In 1951, the number of the KMT troops had increased to at least four
thousand.  By then, the operations of the KMT troops had extended to the Wa and
Kokang States.  But the area of operations still remained east of the Salween River.  In
1952, the numbers of the KMT troops had increased to approximately 12,000, and the
area of operations was extended to cover the whole eastern portion of Burma including
areas west of the Salween from the Bhamo area in the north, right down to the area of
Moulmein in the south and westward to include the Kayah State. 23)
The KMT interference in Burmese internal affairs had caused concern for the
Burmese government.  The KMT had liaised with the Karen insurgents and engaged in
subversive propaganda against the Burmese Government.  For example, on November
1, 1952 Mr. Chiu instructed the Commander of the Chung battalion to assist “the
Kawthulay Government and Karens and Mons,” and to assist them as much as we can
so that they may become strong enough to achieve their aim of reorganizing the
Government and to work together with us for the object of Anti-Communism. 24)
When the KMT troops occupied the Monghsu area, they preached that they were
out to help the people who were being oppressed by the government of the Union of
Burma and that their purpose was to restore the Shan chiefs who had recently agreed
to give up their executive powers and functions in favour of a more democratic from of
government to their former positions of authority and power.  They had issued leaflets
in Burmese and Shan inciting the citizens of the Union of Burma to disobey the orders
of government and even to rebel against the government.  Their object was to set up
the minority groups inhabiting the eastern portions of the Union of Burma against the
lawfully established government. 25) The government expressed apprehension over the
issues of the political activity of the KMT troops in Burmese areas.  Telegraphic Service
No. Fa Ching/134, dated 3 July 1952 illustrates the point (1953: 173): 
...Try by every means to incite the Sawbwas and the Headmen to spread sedition
against the Burmese Government by propagating that the Burmese Government is
abolishing the system of Sawbwas Administration by utilizing the recruits, Shan
Volunteers, in order to accomplish its intention of governing all the nationalities
by the Burmese.  The recruiting officers sent by the Burmese Government and the
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volunteers recruited shall be denied with passes issued by us and we shall put all
kinds of obstacles in their way. 26)
Thus, the chief cause of anxiety among the Burmese was the fear of their powerful
neighbours, especially the PRC.  The Burmese believed that the Communist Chinese
were attempting to prepare the opposition in Burma by assisting the Burmese
Communist Party to set up administration in upper Burma.  The position at that time
was the KMT troops were fighting between the Communist Chinese and the Burmese
forces.  The Burmese government was also taking steps to prevent the KMT troops
from retreating further into Burma and thus deprive the Communist Chinese of an
excuse to invade Burma in pursuit of the KMT troops. 
During his conversation with American Ambassador Sebald, on 25 July 1952, U Nu,
the Prime Minister, expressed his concern that the insurgents, and particularly the
Communist elements thereof, would flee to Communist China where they would be
furnished with new armaments, regrouped and retrained, and would probably re-enter
Burma to begin a rebellion all over again. 27)
Thus the Burmese government had appealed to the American government for
diplomatic aid in removing the KMT troops from Burmese territory.  Such
apprehension over the Burmese leader’s intentions on the part of the American
government was summed up as follows by the telegram sent from Rangoon to the
Secretary of State on May 16, 1951. 
...Government of Burma had requested US diplomatic aid in ridding Burma of
KMT’s and that we had taken up matter with Chiang Kai-Shek.  Article also
referred to arms smuggling from Thailand to estimated 5,000-10,000 Chinese
Nationalists reported involved. 28)
Commenting on the fact that the Burmese Government had asked for the American
assistance to clear the KMT troops from the Burmese territory, the Burmese officials
remarked that “the KMT Government and its troops were being preserved by the
Americans and that any assistance given the KMT soldiers from Siam must be the
work of American expansionists”. 29)
In 1951, the government of Burma also requested the United Nations to take action
on the KMT troops in the Shan States.The telegram from the American embassy,
Rangoon to the Secretary of State on 19 September 1951 described a draft of a letter
prepared by U Nu to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (1951): 
...The letter described the manner in which the KMT troops had intruded into the
Burmese territory, the danger to Burmese security which their continued presence
threatened, the efforts which the US and UK Governments had made to persuade
the Nationalist Chinese Government at Taipei to remove these troops and
mentioned the fact that KMT troops had American arms and some American
advisers.  Mr. Tomlinson (The Counselor of British Embassy) received from his
Foreign Office three measures which the US and the UK Governments should
take: 
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1. Every effort should be made to induce the Nationalist Chinese Government
to move these troops from Burma. 
2. Every effort should be made to make sure that no American-adventurers
smugglers, et al. were involved in this operation. 
3. That the US and UK should make a joint approach to the Thai Government
in an effort to persuade that government to prevent the passage of arms to the
KMT troops through Thailand. 30)
The United States and the KMT
The United States was involved in the KMT problem because the US was accused as
being the source and route of supplies to General Li Mi.  For example, a Reuters report
in January 1952 charged that the Americans had armed the Nationalist Chinese troops
from Chiang’s Taiwan strong-hold daily through Thailand to join General Li Mi’s
forces in Burma.  The same news agency reported that the Nationalist Chinese had
seized a large area of Burmese territory and had built air fields, fortifications and
harassed the villages and definitely showed no signs of being induced to be
repatriated. 31)
However, the Burmese government was deeply disappointed with the attitude of the
United States with the KMT problem.  The United States failed to apply sufficient
pressure on Taiwan to withdraw its troops.  The United States tended to accept the
Nationalist Chinese Government’s statement that it exerted “little effective control over
KMT troops in Burma”. 32)
Therefore, the American government could not be held responsible for their
presence nor be forced to withdraw the KMT troops.  Thus, the Burmese leaders came
to believe that the United States was not interested in attaining a solution to the
problem because it was clandestinely supporting the KMT troops. 
Thailand’s relations with Burma also continued to deteriorate.  In May 1951, the
Burmese Ambassador in Bangkok was instructed to complain to the Thai government
that the KMT troops in Burma had been receiving arms, ammunition, medicine and
new recruits through Thailand. 33) After having threatened many times, the Burmese
Foreign Minister finally sent a telegram to the United Nations Secretary-General on
March 25, 1953, requesting that a “Complaint by the Union of Burma Regarding
Aggression Against Her by the Kuomintang Government of Formosa” be placed on the
agenda of the current Seventh Session of the General Assembly. 34) When the matter
was submitted, the United States took immediate action to keep the KMT issue from
being debated, so that embarrassing disclosure of all the circumstances surrounding the
KMT activities would be avoided.  In view of this, the American Government decided
to call for the KMT troops withdrawal from Burma.  The United States began to put
more pressure on the Nationalist Chinese Government to order the KMT troops
withdrawn, and at the same time actively tried to get the Thai government’s
cooperation in facilitating the evacuation. 35) The Thai government responded by
offering to permit the evacuation of the KMT troops through Thailand provided they
were first disarmed. 36)
These belated gestures from the US and Thailand, however, did not dissuade Burma
from pursuing its action at the United Nations.  The Burmese complaint was debated
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on 17 April 1953.
The key to the whole problem was the attitude of the US Government.  It gradually
lost interest in supporting the KMT troops because their offensive in Yunnan had been
a debacle, exposing their military uselessness.  Moreover, Burma threatened to bring
the matter before the United Nations with the embarrassing prospect of the US
involvement being disclosed and condemned.  The US therefore revised its policy and
withdrew its support for the KMT.  For similar reasons, the Thai Government also
came to the conclusion that it was more a liability than an asset to support these troops.
It therefore cooperated closely with the US in expediting the evacuation of these troops
during 1953 and 1954.
It was estimated that about 5,000 KMT troops remained in the southern Shan States
after most of them were evacuated to Taiwan in 1953 and 1954.  The Burmese Army
also mounted operations against the KMT in 1955 and 1956.  As a result of these
operations, the KMT was forced to cross the border into Laos and Thailand. (In Laos at
Mong Singh and Thailand at Doi Lang, Chiang Mai).  Some deserters wives and
families sought political asylum in Thailand. 37) A similar phenomenon appeared to
have taken place along the Mekong and a number of them were believed to be in Laos,
with the consent of the Laotian government. 38)
On arrival in Thailand, they occupied sites of their own choosing, in all cases within
easy reach of the Burmese border.  This suggests that they intended to carry on
business and to maintain contacts with Burma and with the understanding of Thai
authorities.  The KMT had an agreement with the Thai Government whereby they
would safeguard the border areas of Thailand. 39) There were two principal camp areas.
The first was at Doi Mae Salong, Mae Chan District, Chiang Rai.  It lies at the foot of
Doi Tung.  The second area was in Fang (now Chai Prakan District), Chiang Mai
Province.
The Thais officially claimed that they were negotiating with both the Burmese and
Taiwanese governments for a solution but probably there was no enthusiasm behind
their efforts to reach a settlement.
After the fall of the Chinese mainland into the hand of the Communists, the United
States believed that the Communist Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia was likely
to occur unless it was opposed by a substantial force.  The American government had
not recognized the Peking government and had so far opposed its membership of the
United Nations, although it stated that it would fall in with the wishes of the majority of
the members.  The primary objective of the United States should be in the political
sphere and in that connection the United States should act on particular problems as
they arise in Asian countries in such a way as to offer compelling evidence that the
United States accepted the right of Asian nationalist leaders to determine their own
affairs in their own way and intended to give no support to foreign powers.  The
military counterpart of this policy would be for the United States to make it known that
its military resources were available for immediate support of any decision reached by
the United Nations which had as its purpose the preservation of national borders from
military aggression by hostile neighbors. 40) The Republican Party, which enjoyed the
widespread prestige of its popular candidate General Dwight D. Eisenhower, accused
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the Truman Administration of being “soft” on Communism especially in Asia.  The
Democrats were excoriated for the victory of the Communists in China and the bitter
experiences of the American military forces in Korea.  Much more should be done, the
Republican claimed, to prevent further Communist aggression in other parts of Asia
and throughout the world.  After his election, President Eisenhower promised that his
administration would follow a new positive foreign policy to block any further
advances by the Communists and to bolster the nation’s anti-Communist allies.
American foreign policy underwent more of change in tone and style than in substance
with the inauguration of President Eisenhower and his appointment of John Foster
Dulles as Secretary of State.  It was Dulles who had written the containment policy in
1952. 41)
However, foreign policy during President Eisenhower’s first term reaffirmed the
nation’s major postwar undertakings to resist Communist encroachment through
collective security backed by substantial American aid; to press for its goals through
negotiations rather than armed conflict; and to support the United Nations as the
principal forum for resolving international conflicts.  The American government’s self-
interest dictated that Communism should not be allowed to overflow from China into
the surrounding countries.  If Indochina, Burma and Thailand were to fall, it would be
possible to bring very considerable pressure to bear on Malaya not only by infiltration
tactics but also by cutting off the supply of rice on which Malaya is so heavily
dependent.  If the Communists were to be contained, the long run economic
programme must be supplemented by more immediate measures which faced up to the
fact that they still lived in a world of power politics. 42)
A new look would be given to the American military posture, and new stress placed
on deterrent military power and collective regional security.  In his inaugural address
the new president stated (1965: 97): 
...We hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will
determine the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace.
Appreciating that economic need, military security, and political wisdom combine
to suggest regional groups of free peoples, we hope within the framework of the
United Nations to help strengthen such special bonds the world over. 43)
It was generally assumed that the non-Communist governments in the region would
benefit greatly from an increased emphasis on military power, and that the Asian
countries would willingly cooperate in advancing these objectives of American foreign
policy.  The implementation of these policy changes was placed in the hands of the
new Dulles.  In his first major speech Dulles stated in May 1951 that “Indochina is the
key to Southeast Asia upon the resources of which Japan largely depends”. 44)
As these developments were taking place in Southeast Asia, the United States and
the People’s Republic of China found itself involved in a direct and more threatening
clash over Taiwan.  As during the Korean War each nation was convinced in this
dispute that it was legitimately defending its national interests and accused the other of
imperialist aggression.  The Communist Chinese continued to consider Taiwan a
province of China; the United States not only still recognized the Nationalist Chinese
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government as the government of all China, but also included Taiwan within its
defensive perimeter in the Western Pacific.
By the time the United States made the decision to grant economic aid to the
Southeast Asian countries, the KMT troops were regarded to be the vanguard
Southeast Asia.  In connection with any consideration of possible greater use of the
KMT troops, there was a considerable programme being carried on with American
help which used the Nationalist Chinese forces in a manner of keeping the Communist
Chinese on the mainland.  Such raids might be a useful means of preventing the
Chinese Communist from reinforcing their forces in Korea or dispatching Nationalist
Chinese forces to Indochina. 45)
The American policy on Taiwan and KMT may be summarized as follows (1953):
...The new US policy toward Formosa is expected to step up Nationalist raids on
the mainland of Red China and may permit an airlift of men and material to
Chinese Nationalists forces clinging to a foothold in the Burma border region.
The policy switch would permit reinforcement and supply of General Li Mi’s
10,000 to 15,000 troops who have held out on the Burmese border area of
southwest China since the collapse of Nationalist armies on the mainland in late
1949. 46)
During the Korean War in 1950-1953, the US policy in the Far East was to disperse
the Communist Chinese forces by opening another front area on the Sino-Burmese
border.  It was believed that the KMT troops in Kengtung had been supplied by the
United States via Thailand.  The British reports indicated that the planes supplying the
KMT belonged to Claire Chennault’s China Air Transport (CAT) and were operating
out of Saigon. 47) There had various reports of up to six Americans with the KMT
troops. 
...AG. 2 Intelligence officer or possibly head agent, is believed to have CAT cover
in Hong Kong.  Two Americans in CAT (China Air Transport) are financial
backers of magazine entitled “Army Council” now produced in Hong Kong.  This
may be a private venture but it is at least equally likely that it covers O.P.C. / CIA
interests. 48)
The Burmese government requested the US to ask the Nationalist Chinese to
instruct the KMT troops in Burma to lay down their arms and permit themselves to be
interned by the Burmese government.  But it was the American policy to use KMT
troops to force the Burmese government to review its neutral policy. 
The US State Department realised that the presence of KMT troops would provide
the Communist Chinese with a pretext to invade Burma.  In the context, the United
States thought that there was a strong desire to supply adequate military aid to Burma. 
However, in March 1953, the Government of Burma requested that the American
government not continue its aid programme beyond June 30, 1953, until such time as
the government of the Union of Burma was able to settle the KMT issue completely.
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Such questions as the future status of Taiwan, the possibility of Communist Chinese
intervention in Korea, the admission of the Communist China into the United Nations
and the Communist menace in Southeast Asia were, in essence, two reasons why the
KMT problem was linked with the American aid programme.  The United States was
obsessed by the Communist danger.  Partly, this might be the reason for the American
support of the Nationalist Chinese troops. 
The KMT troops’ withdrawal would have had to be carried out through Indochina
or Thailand with Burmese forces ostensibly driving them out.  However Thai
sensitivities resulting from such a migration concerned the American government and
an offer of aid was considered to help the Thai accept this situation.
The Thai government had always been concerned with the security of Thailand’s
northern border.  The idea of using the remnant KMT troops as a buffer force
therefore appealed to Thai military leaders.  Moreover, since these troops were
clandestinely supported by the CIA, it was seen as another opportunity to show the US
that Thailand would cooperate in fighting Communism.  As a result of the aid given to
the KMT troops, they were able to operate along the Sino-Burmese border.
Accordingly, in early 1957 President Eisenhower applied the so-called “Eisenhower
Doctrine”.  Later, this doctorine became the American government’s global policy.
The essence of the doctrine was: (1) assisting non-Communist nations in economic
development; (2) cooperating militarily with those nations; and (3) using American
forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of
nations requesting such aid. 49) The political situation in Laos during the late 1950’s and
early 1960’s was a major concern for the United States regarding the KMT troops in
Southeast Asia.  President John F. Kennedy showed that the United States would
intervene to prevent a Communist takeover in Laos.  In an attempt to gain American
support, the KMT troops moved to the Thai-Laos border.  Its troops deployed along
the border represented moral support to Gen. Phoumi Norsawan, as well as a clear
indication to the United States of its concern for Thai security.
However, the presence of the KMT was a growing concern.  It provided vivid
evidence that the Thai Government had been trapped by the commitment to the
American government’s Communist containment policy, which would not allow the
Thai government to adjust easily to the new international political scene.
Since 1961 a probable majority of the remaining KMT resided in Chiang Mai,
Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son provinces in northern Thailand.  While no longer
fighting for political reasons, they had an interest in the lucrative opium trade in the
Shan State of Burma.  In a most profitable business, the KMT escorted 90 percent of
the opium grown in the Shan State to the international drug traders in Bangkok and
Saigon. 50) As reported by the British Consulate in Chiang Mai in August 1962 (1962):
“there are still 3,500 KMT troops in Thailand, they have settled down with local wives
and are principally engaged in the illegal opium trade”. 51)
Once again, however, regional events were to frustrate American expectations for
greater programming autonomy.  By 1969 American troops were being withdrawn
from South Vietnam and Thai soldiers were no longer needed in Vietnam.  The
political conditions cited to justify the high foreign aid levels to Thailand were now
openly challenged. 52) By 1971 Thailand became increasingly occupied with adjusting
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foreign policy to suit the changing role of the United States in Asia, and to take into
account the emergence of China in world affairs.  Hence, the KMT troops in Southeast
Asia were trapped by the commitment to the United States in foreign affairs.  The
United States realized that the KMT troops were the problem in Southeast Asian
countries such as Burma, Thailand and Laos.  But the United States could not hold and
solve this problem except to let them rest with these countries.  The response of the
KMT troops in Thailand, would effect in particular the political, economic and social
situations in the countries which the KMT troops had settled down.
The role of the KMT troops was well known in Thailand, despite the fact that the
Thai government did not admit publicly that these troops were located within Thailand
until 1972.  The attitude of some Thai officials toward the KMT troops and its
involvement in the opium trade is perhaps exemplified by words of a Border Patrol
Police officer, “as long as the KMT remains quiet we leave them alone.  Of course
opium running is illegal.  But its the only source of money for the hill tribes”. 53)
This hands-off attitude toward the KMT troops on the part of the Thai government
was abruptly ended in the early 1970s by the latter’s willingness to end the KMT
troops’ role in the opium trade.  The Thai government was subjected to increased
pressure from the United States to curb the flow of narcotics from its northern borders
through Bangkok.  At that time a United States government report stated that the
Golden Triangle was producing 1,000 tons or eighty percent of the world heroin supply
and most of it was smuggled through Thailand’s capital. 54)
The Thai government was perhaps predisposed to yield to such prodding because of
the KMT troops’ authority as a buffer against external Communist aggression was
gradually becoming compromised by the negative impact KMT operation of the opium
trade was having on the hill tribes in Thailand.  The KMT troops had assumed the role
of oppressors in Thailand’s border areas by forcing payment of “opium taxes” on
villages and extorting tolls from travelers and traders using the few mountain roads in
the region.  Their control over the refining and marketing of opium also allowed the
tactic of “greening the crops” in which the hill tribe growers were forced to sell their
crops to the KMT troop agents (who were often local Chinese Haw shopkeepers) two
and three years in advance. 55) These heavy handed tactics instilled fear and distrust
among the hill people toward the KMT troops, their supposed protectors, and cast
suspicion toward the Thai government which gave the appearance that the KMT
troops’ behavior was condoned.  This worried Thai government officials because the
hill tribes could be persuaded to join forces with Communist rebels which were active
in the North as in a 1967 Hmong revolt which the KMT troops were instrumental in
putting down.  The Thai government therefore responded to US pressure during the
early 1970s by shutting down the Third and Fifth Army refineries in Tam Ngop and
Mae Salong in 1972 and giving the Border Patrol Police, which was primarily a counter
insurgency and border security agency since its inception in 1953, a key role in the
narcotics suppression efforts. 56)
In exchange for the KMT troops promise in 1972 to refrain from further
involvement in narcotics, the Thai Government provided assistance for their
resettlement and provided legal residence to the KMT troop members. 57) The
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KMT Third and Fifth Armies were disbanded and their members settled in
thirteen villages: Na Pa Paek and Hua Lang in Mae Hong Son Province, Muang
Haeng, Pieng Luang, Khae Noi and Muang Ngai in Chiang Dao District and Tam
Ngop, San Makokwan, Luang in Chai Prakan District; Muang Ngam in Fang
District in Chiang Mai Province, Mae Salong in Mae Chan District, Mae Aep in
Chiang Saen District and Pa Tang in Chiang Khong in Chiang Rai Province. 58)
Despite promises to refrain from involvement in narcotics, and the resettlement of
the KMT, it continued its involvement in the opium trade.  The refineries were moved
to the Burma side of the border while the caravan communications network remained
in place.  However, due to American military aid, there was increased Burmese
pressure on the KMT troops.  The immense mule caravans that transported opium
from Burma into Thailand came to an end.  To avoid increasingly vigorous Burmese
attacks and to reduce the chance of detection, traffickers began using smaller caravans
and human carriers. 59)
The Status of the Chinese Minority
The resettlement plans for the former KMT troops and their family members were
prepared in Bangkok by the Ministry of Defense in early June 1966.  The plans were
presented to the Cabinet committee in the same year.  The plans, were published in
preliminary mimeographed form in 1966 and 1968.  It served as the basis of the
present programme for former KMT troops by the Ministry of Interior.  It discussed
the major problems, including (1) promoting a more stabilized economy; (2) replacing
opium growing by developing new cash crops; (3) administration and control in the
remote hills and frontier regions.
On the basis of this report, the Thai government formulated policy measures which
included administrative measures and development activities.  An action programme
was suggested, with the two major projects: (1) intensification and broadening of
settlement project activities; (2) transferring responsibility from social and vocational
development.  Some of the main principles which were recommended on the basis of
the reports were as follows:
1) Land Settlement Projects, in Chiang Mai Province, three districts of Mae Ai, 
Fang and Chiang Dao. 
2) To transfer the responsibility of the former KMT troops from Ministry of
Defense to Ministry of Interior.  The major responsibility of the Ministry of
Interior was to help move the Nationalist Chinese to designated villages and
give them vocational training.
3) These former KMT troops were encouraged to work in the following activities:
a) cultivation of experimental cash crops, which might ultimately replace opium
poppy cultivation, and development of improved and modernized methods
of hill farming.
b) training and demonstration centers for the former KMT troops in vocational
training.
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The KMT villages were in remote areas far from other villages, and sometimes were
illegal.  Therefore, they did not have communication or interaction with other Thai
people.  Legalizing them would help to open them up and familiarize them with the
Thai way of living.  Thus, they would become Thai citizens both legally and abandon
drug trafficking.  Their actions could cause political problems.  But there were also
Yunanese Chinese civilians who took advantage of not being subject to Thai law to
collect taxes illegally and engage in drug trafficking.  Thai actions often caused political
problems.  Thai people who knew about this held government officials responsible for
this.  Therefore, the government realized it had to do something about these illegal
refugees.
The problems with the Yunanese Chinese under the Ministry of Interior in fact was
not so serious since many of them lived near Thai villages and some had intermarried
with Thai people.  Therefore, they integrated and became Thai faster and easier than
the former KMT.  The government had not yet devised a policy to deal with these
independent Chinese, but they planned to use the same strategies as they had with the
former KMT.
Still, the Thai government gave consideration to KMT citizenship as slowly as
possible due to the situation at that time.  Most of the former KMT people thought that
procedures and principles of the Thai government for granting their citizenship were
very difficult and had many obstacles.  These sometimes made the former KMT people
use improper ways which were not good for national security.  Thus, this issue needed
to be considered and revised as fast as possible.
Perhaps more importantly, the Chinese descendants had blended into the fabric of
Thai society as the result of non-discrimination in Thai government policies and several
generations of intermarriage.  Until 1972, when the regime of Thanom Kittikhajohn
issued an emergency order which effectively deprived children born of alien fathers of
Thai citizenship, the bulk of Chinese descendants born in Thailand were accorded
Thai nationality.  In official documents, the first generation of Sino-Thais would be
described in official documents as being of Chinese “race.” From the second generation
onwards, however, they would be formally considered full fledged Thais.  Ironically,
the domestic Chinese assimilation was accompanied by a lengthy period of animosity
and distrust in Thailand’s official level relations with China. 60)
Permission to grant Thai citizenship to the former KMT members required Cabinet
approval.  The granting of Thai citizenship principles would depend on the behaviour
or the activity of the former KMT because the Thai government can withdraw the
KMT citizenship when they perform certain illegal activities.  This is a good principle
for the Thai government to control the KMT people on the one hand, but on the other
hand, the KMT people may feel insecure at the prospect of being discriminated
against.  This would encourage the KMT people try to do something which will earn
them citizenship or identity cards.
The KMT troops were inclined to act autocratically once they were sure of the
“struggle for survival” of their cause.  This was hardly an appropriate characteristic for
refugees.  For this, they were branded drug traffickers by their pro-communist
adversaries and Thai opponents.  Both had laid the blame on Thai government for the
lack of action and lack of measures teken forward the KMT troops.  However, the
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KMT troops improved a great deal when they had to live in Thailand as Thai citizens.
In the struggle for survival, physical force was accepted as an alternative to popular
consent in overcoming any political impasse.  However, the internal and external
politics of Thailand have changed since 1980’s.
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